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Twenty	  years	  ago	  I	  wrote	  “Globalization,	  Tax	  Competition,	  and	  the	  Fiscal	  
Crisis	  of	  the	  Welfare	  State”	  (113	  Harv.	  L.	  Rev.	  1573	  (2000)),	  which	  argued	  
that	  “[t]he	  current	  age	  of	  globalization	  can	  be	  distinguished	  from	  the	  
previous	  one	  (from	  1870	  to	  1914)	  by	  the	  much	  higher	  mobility	  of	  capital	  
than	  labor…	  The	  mobility	  of	  capital	  is	  linked	  to	  tax	  competition,	  in	  which	  
sovereign	  countries	  lower	  their	  tax	  rates	  on	  income	  earned	  by	  foreigners	  
within	  their	  borders	  in	  order	  to	  attract	  both	  portfolio	  and	  direct	  investment.	  
Tax	  competition,	  in	  turn,	  threatens	  to	  undermine	  the	  individual	  and	  
corporate	  income	  taxes,	  which	  traditionally	  have	  been	  the	  main	  source	  of	  
revenue	  …	  for	  modern	  welfare	  states.	  The	  response	  of	  developed	  countries	  
has	  been	  first,	  to	  shift	  the	  tax	  burden	  from	  (mobile)	  capital	  to	  (less	  mobile)	  
labor,	  and	  second,	  when	  further	  increased	  taxation	  of	  labor	  becomes	  
politically	  and	  economically	  difficult,	  to	  cut	  the	  social	  safety	  net.	  Thus,	  
globalization	  and	  tax	  competition	  lead	  to	  a	  fiscal	  crisis	  for	  countries	  that	  wish	  
to	  continue	  to	  provide	  social	  insurance	  to	  their	  citizens	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  
demographic	  factors	  and	  the	  increased	  income	  inequality,	  job	  insecurity,	  and	  
income	  volatility	  that	  result	  from	  globalization	  render	  such	  social	  insurance	  
more	  necessary…	  This	  article	  argues	  that	  if	  both	  globalization	  and	  social	  
insurance	  are	  to	  be	  maintained,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  cut	  the	  intermediate	  link	  by	  
limiting	  tax	  competition	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  congruent	  with	  maintaining	  the	  
ability	  of	  democratic	  states	  to	  determine	  the	  desirable	  size	  of	  their	  
government.”	  This	  paper	  reviews	  the	  development	  of	  tax	  competition	  in	  the	  
subsequent	  two	  decades	  and	  argues	  that	  while	  it	  became	  worse	  in	  the	  period	  
from	  1998	  to	  2008,	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008	  and	  subsequent	  developments	  
led	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  promising	  limits	  to	  tax	  competition	  in	  OECD	  countries	  
that	  in	  turn	  should	  enable	  them	  to	  strengthen	  the	  welfare	  state.	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The	  thesis	  of	  “Globalization,	  Tax	  Competition,	  and	  the	  Fiscal	  Crisis	  of	  the	  
Welfare	  State”2	  (“Globalization”)	  was	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  tax	  competition	  for	  both	  
portfolio	  capital	  and	  for	  direct	  investment	  weakened	  the	  ability	  of	  both	  
developed	  and	  developing	  countries	  to	  maintain	  an	  adequate	  social	  safety	  
net	  for	  their	  citizens,	  and	  that	  to	  maintain	  that	  safety	  net	  it	  was	  essential	  to	  
place	  limits	  on	  tax	  competition.	  The	  thesis	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  that	  the	  financial	  
crisis	  of	  2008-­‐9	  led	  to	  further	  pressure	  on	  the	  safety	  net,	  and	  that	  in	  turn	  led	  
to	  the	  enactment	  of	  meaningful	  limits	  to	  tax	  competition	  in	  OECD	  countries.	  
In	  turn,	  such	  limits	  (and	  further	  limits	  that	  should	  be	  enacted)	  should	  make	  it	  
possible	  to	  strengthen	  the	  safety	  net	  in	  the	  coming	  decade.	  The	  risk	  is	  that	  if	  
this	  is	  not	  done,	  it	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  further	  rise	  in	  xenophobic	  nationalism,	  a	  
retreat	  from	  globalization,	  and	  potentially	  to	  war.	  
	  
2. The	  Decline	  of	  the	  ITR,	  1980-­‐2008	  
	  
Before	  the	  1980s,	  the	  international	  tax	  regime	  (ITR)	  functioned	  as	  an	  
adequate	  protective	  device	  against	  tax	  competition	  and	  therefore	  protected	  
the	  social	  safety	  net.	  The	  ITR	  is	  based	  on	  two	  principles,	  the	  benefits	  
principle	  and	  the	  single	  tax	  principle.	  The	  benefits	  principle	  states	  that	  active	  
(business)	  income	  should	  be	  taxed	  primarily	  by	  the	  source	  jurisdiction	  and	  
passive	  (investment)	  income	  should	  be	  taxed	  primarily	  by	  the	  residence	  
jurisdiction.	  The	  single	  tax	  principle	  states	  that	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  ITR	  is	  to	  
prevent	  both	  double	  taxation	  and	  double	  non-­‐taxation,	  and	  therefore	  that	  the	  
secondary	  taxing	  jurisdiction	  (residence	  for	  active	  income	  and	  source	  for	  
passive	  income)	  should	  impose	  tax	  in	  situation	  where	  the	  primary	  taxing	  
jurisdiction	  does	  not	  do	  so.3	  
	  
Before	  the	  1980s,	  residence	  jurisdictions	  were	  able	  to	  impose	  tax	  on	  most	  
passive	  income	  because	  exchange	  controls	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  invest	  offshore,	  
and	  because	  source	  jurisdictions	  imposed	  withholding	  taxes	  on	  such	  income.	  
Active	  income	  was	  in	  turn	  taxed	  by	  source	  jurisdictions	  because	  it	  was	  less	  
mobile,	  and	  CFC	  rules	  imposed	  residence-­‐based	  tax	  on	  it	  in	  cases	  where	  it	  
was	  more	  mobile	  and	  therefore	  escaped	  source-­‐based	  taxation.4	  
	  
As	  “Globalization”	  explains	  in	  detail,	  this	  situation	  changed	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  
1990s.	  Globalization	  led	  most	  countries	  to	  relax	  their	  exchange	  controls	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Globalization,	  Tax	  Competition,	  and	  the	  Fiscal	  Crisis	  of	  the	  Welfare	  State,	  
113	  Harv.	  L.	  Rev.	  1573	  (2000).	  
3	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  International	  Taxation	  of	  Electronic	  Commerce,	  	  52	  Tax	  L.	  Rev.	  507	  	  
(1997);	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Who	  Invented	  the	  Single	  Tax	  Principle?	  An	  Essay	  on	  the	  History	  of	  
US	  Treaty	  Policy,	  59	  NYLS	  L	  Rev	  305	  (2015).	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portfolio	  investments	  overseas	  became	  common.	  In	  addition,	  starting	  with	  
the	  US	  in	  1984,	  most	  OECD	  members	  unilaterally	  abolished	  withholding	  
taxes	  on	  outbound	  interest	  payments,	  thereby	  aiding	  and	  abetting	  tax	  
evasion	  by	  residents	  of	  other	  OECD	  members.	  For	  active	  income,	  the	  
increased	  mobility	  of	  multinational	  enterprises	  (MNEs)	  led	  source	  
jurisdictions	  to	  offer	  targeted	  tax	  holidays,	  and	  the	  fear	  of	  tax	  competition	  for	  
headquarters	  of	  MNEs	  led	  residence	  jurisdictions	  to	  relax	  their	  controlled	  
foreign	  corporation	  (CFC)	  rules.	  The	  result	  was	  that	  neither	  the	  residence	  
jurisdiction	  of	  the	  multinational	  nor	  the	  production	  jurisdiction	  typically	  
taxed	  its	  income	  on	  a	  current	  basis.	  The	  only	  jurisdiction	  that	  was	  not	  subject	  
to	  this	  type	  of	  tax	  competition	  was	  the	  market	  jurisdiction,	  but	  after	  the	  
creation	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  digital	  economy	  in	  the	  1990s,	  it	  
became	  possible	  for	  MNEs	  to	  earn	  billions	  in	  income	  from	  market	  
jurisdictions	  without	  being	  subject	  to	  tax	  because	  of	  the	  permanent	  
establishment	  limitation	  (which	  states	  that	  a	  country	  may	  not	  tax	  active	  
income	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  physical	  presence	  of	  the	  multinational).5	  
	  
In	  the	  first	  decade	  after	  I	  wrote	  “Globalization”	  things	  only	  got	  worse.	  On	  the	  
passive	  income	  front,	  it	  became	  possible	  to	  avoid	  withholding	  taxes	  not	  just	  
on	  interest	  (because	  of	  unilateral	  abolition),	  royalties	  (because	  of	  the	  
treaties)	  and	  capital	  gains	  (because	  of	  the	  source	  rules),	  but	  also	  on	  portfolio	  
dividends	  because	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  derivatives,	  which	  enabled	  portfolio	  
investors	  to	  receive	  the	  economic	  equivalent	  of	  the	  dividend	  without	  being	  
subject	  to	  withholding	  taxes.	  	  In	  addition,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  limits	  on	  the	  
exchange	  of	  information	  such	  as	  bank	  secrecy,	  dual	  criminality,	  and	  the	  
requirement	  that	  information	  only	  be	  exchanged	  on	  request	  meant	  that	  in	  
most	  cases	  residence	  jurisdictions	  could	  not	  effectively	  tax	  foreign	  source	  
portfolio	  income	  (earned	  primarily	  by	  the	  rich).	  In	  2005,	  Joe	  Guttentag	  and	  I	  
estimated	  that	  the	  US	  was	  losing	  $50	  billion	  a	  year	  to	  such	  tax	  evasion,	  and	  
that	  most	  other	  countries	  were	  in	  worse	  shape	  because	  the	  shadow	  economy	  
was	  larger.6	  
	  
On	  the	  active	  income	  front,	  the	  decade	  1998-­‐2008	  saw	  the	  enactment	  of	  
check	  the	  box	  and	  IRC	  section	  954(c)(6),	  which	  meant	  that	  the	  US	  CFC	  rules	  
became	  incapable	  of	  enforcing	  residence	  based	  taxation	  of	  US-­‐based	  
multinationals.	  Deferral,	  which	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  tax	  expenditure	  in	  the	  US,	  
exploded	  from	  less	  than	  $20	  billion	  in	  the	  mid	  1990s	  to	  the	  second	  largest	  tax	  
expenditure	  in	  the	  US	  budget,	  worth	  $1.348	  trillion	  for	  the	  decade	  2017-­‐
2026.7	  This	  was	  justified	  in	  the	  name	  of	  preserving	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  
US-­‐based	  MNEs,	  but	  it	  resulted	  in	  shifting	  of	  massive	  amounts	  of	  income	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Globalization,	  supra.	  	  
6	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  “Closing	  the	  International	  Tax	  Gap,”	  in	  Max	  B.	  Sawicky	  (ed.),	  Bridging	  
the	  Tax	  Gap:	  Addressing	  the	  Crisis	  in	  Federal	  Tax	  Administration	  (2005),	  99	  (with	  J.	  
Guttentag).	  
7	  US	  Treasury,	  Tax	  Expenditure	  Budget,	  2017.	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from	  the	  US	  to	  low	  tax	  jurisdictions:	  By	  2017	  US	  MNEs	  had	  close	  to	  $3	  trillion	  
in	  profits	  “trapped”	  in	  low-­‐taxed	  jurisdictions	  offshore.	  Ireland,	  Luxembourg,	  
and	  many	  other	  jurisdictions	  enacted	  low-­‐tax	  regimes	  designed	  to	  attract	  
such	  active	  income,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  headquarters	  of	  multinationals.	  Over	  thirty	  
US-­‐based	  MNEs	  “inverted”	  to	  Ireland	  and	  other	  low-­‐taxed	  jurisdictions,	  
primarily	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  US	  tax	  rate	  on	  US	  source	  income	  and	  to	  
enable	  the	  distribution	  of	  low-­‐taxed	  foreign-­‐sourced	  income	  to	  
shareholders.8	  	  
	  
Thus,	  a	  decade	  after	  “Globalization”,	  the	  problem	  it	  described	  was	  
significantly	  worse	  than	  when	  it	  was	  written.	  Both	  the	  individual	  income	  tax	  
(designed	  primarily	  to	  preserve	  progressivity)	  and	  the	  corporate	  income	  tax	  
(designed	  primarily	  to	  regulate	  MNEs)	  were	  under	  tremendous	  pressure,	  
and	  the	  resulting	  decline	  in	  revenues	  and	  the	  inability	  of	  most	  jurisdictions	  to	  
raise	  consumption	  taxes	  (because	  they	  were	  already	  prohibitively	  high)	  
meant	  that	  the	  social	  safety	  net	  was	  under	  severe	  pressure	  as	  well.	  And	  then	  
came	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008	  and	  the	  Great	  Recession,	  and	  all	  hell	  broke	  
loose.	  	  
	  
3. The	  Impact	  of	  the	  Great	  Recession:	  FATCA,	  CRS,	  BEPS,	  ATAP	  and	  TCJA	  
	  
On	  September	  11,	  2008,	  I	  was	  testifying	  before	  the	  US	  Senate	  Permanent	  
Subcommittee	  on	  Investigations	  (PSI)	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  investors	  and	  
investment	  banks	  to	  avoid	  withholding	  taxes	  on	  dividends	  by	  using	  
derivatives,	  because	  dividend	  equivalents	  on	  derivatives	  were	  exempt	  from	  
withholding	  tax.	  The	  PSI	  investigation	  discovered	  that	  even	  direct	  investors	  
were	  avoiding	  the	  withholding	  tax	  by	  selling	  their	  shares	  to	  an	  investment	  
bank	  the	  day	  before	  the	  dividend,	  receiving	  the	  dividend	  equivalent,	  and	  then	  
buying	  the	  shares	  back	  the	  day	  after.	  The	  investors	  and	  the	  bankers	  were	  
busy	  calling	  each	  other	  liars,	  and	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  both	  could	  not	  be	  telling	  
the	  truth	  under	  oath.	  Suddenly,	  the	  witnesses	  started	  looking	  nervously	  at	  
their	  Blackberries,	  and	  then	  scurrying	  out	  of	  the	  room:	  Lehman	  Brothers	  
(which	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  active	  players	  in	  this	  scheme)	  had	  collapsed,	  and	  
the	  financial	  crisis	  had	  started.9	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Inversions	  and	  Competitiveness:	  Reflections	  in	  the	  Wake	  of	  Pfizer-­‐
Allergan,	  41	  Int’l	  Tax	  J.	  39	  (2015)	  (with	  O.	  Marian).	  
9	  This	  hearing	  led	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  IRC	  section	  871(m)	  in	  2010,	  which	  imposed	  
withholding	  tax	  on	  dividend	  equivalents.	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Testimony	  on	  Dividend	  Tax	  
Abuse,	  U.S.	  Senate	  Permanent	  Subcommittee	  on	  Investigations,	  Sept.	  11,	  2008;	  Avi-­‐
Yonah,	  Enforcing	  Dividend	  Withholding	  on	  Derivatives,	  Shelf	  Project	  Proposal,	  121	  
Tax	  Notes	  747	  (Nov.	  10,	  2008).	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The	  crisis	  and	  the	  Great	  Recession	  that	  followed	  led	  to	  millions	  losing	  their	  
jobs	  and	  their	  homes,	  and	  frequently	  their	  families	  as	  well.	  Moreover,	  in	  
Europe	  the	  governments	  reacted	  to	  the	  pressure	  on	  the	  Eurozone	  by	  
imposing	  austerity	  and	  sharply	  cutting	  the	  social	  safety	  net.	  While	  the	  Obama	  
Administration	  made	  no	  such	  cuts,	  and	  the	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  was	  a	  
meaningful	  move	  toward	  bolstering	  the	  safety	  net,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  US	  fiscal	  
stimulus	  was	  too	  limited,	  and	  while	  the	  banks	  were	  saved	  millions	  of	  
Americans	  suffered	  a	  decade	  of	  low	  growth	  and	  unemployment.10	  	  
	  
The	  political	  reaction	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  was	  dramatic.	  It	  led	  
directly	  to	  Brexit,	  the	  election	  of	  Donald	  Trump	  in	  the	  US	  and	  of	  other	  right-­‐
wing	  populists	  in	  the	  EU,	  and	  the	  prospect	  of	  serious	  limits	  to	  globalization	  in	  
the	  form	  of	  immigration	  restrictions,	  tariffs,	  and	  the	  re-­‐enactment	  of	  
exchange	  controls.11	  The	  nation	  state	  was	  reasserting	  itself,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  
instruments	  it	  used	  was	  taxation.	  In	  the	  US	  the	  focus	  on	  taxation	  was	  limited	  
to	  the	  first	  couple	  of	  years	  after	  the	  crisis,	  since	  the	  Republican	  takeover	  of	  
the	  House	  in	  2010	  meant	  that	  no	  tax	  measures	  could	  be	  enacted	  before	  2017.	  
But	  in	  Europe	  austerity	  meant	  a	  continued	  political	  focus	  on	  taxing	  both	  the	  
rich	  and	  MNEs.	  In	  the	  US,	  the	  “Double	  Irish	  Dutch	  Sandwich”	  was	  once	  
described	  in	  detail	  in	  2010	  on	  the	  NBC	  Evening	  News,	  but	  the	  topic	  faded	  
thereafter.	  In	  Europe,	  taxes	  became	  front-­‐page	  matter	  for	  the	  whole	  period	  
after	  2008,	  and	  this	  political	  attention	  is	  still	  ongoing.	  	  
	  
The	  result	  has	  been	  a	  series	  of	  developments	  that	  led	  to	  a	  significant	  
enhancement	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  ITR	  to	  capture	  cross-­‐border	  income.	  
	  
On	  the	  passive	  income	  front,	  a	  key	  development	  was	  the	  UBS	  scandal	  of	  
2006-­‐8,	  which	  led	  directly	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  FATCA	  in	  2010.	  The	  UBS	  
hearing	  before	  the	  PSI	  revealed	  that	  UBS	  sent	  bankers	  directly	  to	  the	  US	  to	  
solicit	  rich	  individuals	  to	  set	  up	  shell	  companies	  in	  the	  Caymans	  and	  then	  
reinvest	  the	  money	  through	  UBS	  into	  the	  US.	  UBS	  claimed	  that	  even	  though	  it	  
was	  a	  “qualified	  intermediary”	  (QI)	  and	  knew	  who	  the	  real	  owner	  of	  the	  
shells	  was,	  it	  was	  justified	  under	  the	  QI	  regulations	  in	  relying	  on	  a	  form	  
W8BEN	  that	  stated	  that	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  income	  was	  the	  Caymans	  shell	  and	  
that	  it	  was	  foreign.12	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Be	  Careful	  What	  You	  Wish	  For:	  Reducing	  Inequality	  in	  the	  21st	  Century,	  
116	  Mich.L.	  Rev.	  1001	  (2018)	  (with	  O.	  Avi-­‐Yonah).	  
11	  See	  Kim	  Clausing,	  Open:	  The	  Progressive	  Case	  for	  Free	  Trade,	  Immigration,	  and	  
Global	  Capital	  (2019).	  
12	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Testimony	  on	  Banking	  Secrecy	  Practices	  and	  Wealthy	  American	  
Taxpayers,	  US	  House	  Committee	  on	  Ways	  and	  Means,	  Subcommittee	  on	  Select	  
Revenue	  Measures	  (March	  31,	  2009);	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Testimony	  for	  Hearing	  on	  Offshore	  
Tax	  Evasion,	  U.S.	  Senate	  Finance	  Committee	  (May	  3,	  2007);	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Testimony	  
for	  Hearing	  on	  Offshore	  Transactions,	  U.S.	  Senate	  Permanent	  Subcommittee	  on	  
Investigations	  (Aug.	  1,	  2006).	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The	  result	  was	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Account	  Tax	  Compliance	  Act	  
(FATCA)	  in	  2010,	  which	  imposes	  a	  30%	  withholding	  tax	  on	  the	  US	  income	  of	  
any	  foreign	  financial	  institution	  (FFI)	  that	  knows	  or	  has	  reason	  to	  know	  it	  
holds	  accounts	  of	  US	  residents	  or	  citizens	  and	  does	  not	  reveal	  such	  
information	  to	  the	  IRS.	  Because	  FFIs	  are	  frequently	  prohibited	  from	  directly	  
revealing	  financial	  information	  to	  the	  IRS,	  the	  Obama	  Administration	  
negotiated	  over	  100	  intergovernmental	  agreements	  (IGAs)	  that	  enable	  the	  
FFI	  to	  turn	  over	  the	  information	  to	  its	  own	  government,	  which	  then	  
exchanges	  it	  with	  the	  IRS	  under	  tax	  treaties	  and	  tax	  information	  exchange	  
agreements	  (TIEAs).	  Many	  of	  the	  IGAs	  are	  reciprocal,	  so	  that	  the	  US	  is	  also	  
obligated	  (at	  least	  on	  paper)	  to	  exchange	  information	  about	  foreign	  
residents.	  
	  
The	  IGAs	  in	  turn	  made	  countries	  develop	  a	  Common	  Reporting	  Standard	  
(CRS)	  for	  the	  automatic	  exchange	  of	  financial	  information,	  and	  the	  OECD	  then	  
negotiated	  a	  Multilateral	  Agreement	  on	  Administrative	  Cooperation	  in	  Tax	  
Matters	  (MAATM),	  which	  relies	  on	  the	  CRS	  to	  provide	  for	  automatic	  
exchange	  without	  the	  ability	  to	  rely	  on	  bank	  secrecy	  or	  dual	  criminality	  
provisions.	  Most	  countries	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  all	  OECD	  members	  except	  the	  US	  
have	  ratified	  the	  MAATM.13	  	  
	  
The	  result	  has	  been	  that	  it	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  evade	  income	  taxation	  
now	  than	  it	  was	  ten	  years	  ago.	  A	  potential	  evader	  has	  to	  worry	  that	  in	  almost	  
every	  country	  information	  about	  her	  income	  may	  be	  collected	  and	  
transmitted	  to	  her	  residence	  jurisdiction.	  In	  addition,	  she	  has	  to	  worry	  that	  
the	  information	  may	  either	  be	  leaked	  by	  a	  whistleblower	  (as	  in	  the	  Panama	  
Papers)	  or	  hacked	  (as	  in	  the	  Paradise	  Papers).	  I	  would	  estimate	  that	  FATCA	  
alone	  has	  led	  to	  a	  significant	  decrease	  in	  the	  international	  tax	  gap	  in	  the	  US,	  
well	  below	  my	  $50	  billion	  estimate	  from	  2005.	  
	  
On	  the	  active	  income	  front,	  there	  have	  also	  been	  dramatic	  developments	  in	  
the	  last	  decade.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  OECD	  Base	  Erosion	  and	  Profit	  Shifting	  
(BEPS)	  project	  (2013-­‐15),	  which	  was	  led	  by	  the	  G20	  and	  resulted	  in	  fifteen	  
action	  steps	  designed	  to	  enhance	  both	  source	  and	  residence	  based	  taxation	  of	  
active	  income.	  For	  example,	  BEPS	  Action	  2	  bars	  a	  deduction	  for	  payments	  to	  
hybrid	  entities,	  thereby	  eliminating	  the	  impact	  of	  check	  the	  box.14	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
13	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  And	  Yet	  It	  Moves:	  Taxation	  and	  Labor	  Mobility	  in	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  
Century,	  67	  Tax	  L.	  Rev.	  169	  (2014);	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  IGAs	  vs.	  MAATM:	  Has	  Tax	  Bilateralism	  
Outlived	  Its	  Usefulness?	  66	  CCH	  Global	  Tax	  Weekly	  11	  (Feb.	  13,	  2014)	  (with	  G.	  Savir).	  
14	  See	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Evaluating	  BEPS:	  A	  Reconsideration	  of	  the	  Benefits	  Principle	  and	  
Proposal	  for	  UN	  Oversight,	  6	  Harv.	  Bus.	  L.	  Rev.	  185	  (2016)	  (with	  H.	  Xu).	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BEPS	  was	  introduced	  in	  the	  EU	  as	  the	  Anti-­‐Tax	  Avoidance	  Package	  (ATAP),	  
which	  among	  other	  measures	  requires	  all	  EU	  members	  to	  adopt	  strict	  CFC	  
rules	  (e.g.,	  generally	  requiring	  residence-­‐based	  taxation	  if	  the	  effective	  tax	  
rate	  of	  the	  source	  jurisdiction	  is	  below	  50%	  of	  the	  tax	  rate	  in	  the	  residence	  
jurisdiction).	  This	  measure,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  BEPS	  Action	  2,	  
means	  that	  it	  is	  much	  harder	  now	  to	  shift	  profits	  artificially	  out	  of	  EU	  
member	  states.	  Another	  important	  measure	  in	  BEPS	  and	  ATAP	  is	  the	  primary	  
purpose	  test	  (PPT),	  which	  requires	  that	  all	  tax	  treaties	  incorporate	  language	  
that	  the	  treaty	  will	  not	  apply	  to	  transactions	  if	  a	  primary	  purpose	  of	  the	  
transaction	  was	  tax	  avoidance.15	  
	  
Until	  2017,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  US	  was	  a	  laggard	  in	  terms	  of	  
combating	  tax	  avoidance,	  because	  it	  took	  the	  position	  that	  it	  was	  already	  
compliant	  with	  BEPS,	  rejected	  the	  PPT,	  and	  did	  not	  sign	  the	  MAATM.	  But	  the	  
2017	  tax	  reform	  (TCJA)	  dramatically	  changed	  that.	  TCJA	  includes	  three	  
measures	  that	  significantly	  increase	  taxation	  of	  US-­‐based	  as	  well	  as	  foreign-­‐
based	  MNEs.	  First,	  TCJA	  imposed	  a	  one	  time,	  hefty	  transition	  tax	  on	  the	  $3	  
trillion	  of	  past,	  accumulated	  earnings	  of	  US-­‐based	  MNEs.	  Second,	  while	  TCJA	  
provided	  for	  an	  exemption	  for	  certain	  future	  dividends	  from	  CFCs	  to	  their	  US	  
parents,	  this	  exemption	  is	  strictly	  limited	  to	  a	  deemed	  10%	  return	  on	  
tangible	  property,	  which	  for	  most	  US-­‐based	  MNEs	  is	  close	  to	  zero	  (because	  
they	  rely	  heavily	  on	  intangibles).	  For	  any	  amount	  that	  exceeds	  this	  deemed	  
return,	  TCJA	  imposes	  a	  current	  minimum	  tax	  of	  10.5%	  (13.25%	  if	  foreign	  tax	  
credits	  are	  included)	  on	  worldwide	  earnings	  of	  the	  MNE.	  Third,	  TCJA	  imposes	  
an	  alternative	  minimum	  tax	  of	  10%	  on	  both	  US-­‐	  and	  foreign	  based	  MNEs	  by	  
disregarding	  interest,	  royalty	  and	  some	  other	  payments	  from	  the	  US	  to	  the	  
related	  foreign	  entity.16	  
	  
The	  result	  of	  these	  developments	  (BEPS,	  ATAP	  ad	  TCJA)	  is	  that	  both	  US	  and	  
foreign	  MNEs	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  significantly	  higher	  levels	  of	  tax	  on	  
cross-­‐border	  active	  income	  than	  they	  were	  before	  2008.17	  	  
	  
To	  give	  an	  example:	  The	  structure	  used	  by	  most	  US-­‐based	  MNEs	  before	  2017	  
for	  their	  foreign	  operations	  was	  to	  have	  a	  top	  level	  CFC	  in	  a	  low-­‐tax	  
jurisdiction,	  with	  lower-­‐tier	  CFCs	  in	  high	  tax	  jurisdiction.	  The	  parent	  would	  
transfer	  intellectual	  property	  to	  the	  top	  CFC	  via	  a	  cost	  sharing	  agreement,	  
and	  the	  top	  CFC	  would	  in	  turn	  would	  license	  the	  IP	  to	  the	  lower-­‐tier	  CFCs.	  
The	  key	  to	  this	  structure	  was	  that	  under	  check	  the	  box,	  only	  the	  top	  CFC	  
would	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  corporation,	  while	  all	  the	  lower	  CFCs	  would	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  See	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  BEPS,	  ATAP	  and	  the	  New	  Tax	  Dialogue:	  A	  Transatlantic	  
Competition?	  46	  Intertax	  885	  (2018)	  (with	  G.	  Mazzoni)	  
16	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  BEPS,	  ATAP,	  supra.	  	  
17	  See	  Clausing,	  Profit	  Shifting	  Before	  and	  After	  the	  Tax	  Cuts	  and	  Jobs	  Act	  	  
(2019).	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disregarded	  (i.e.,	  treated	  as	  branches	  of	  the	  top	  CFC).18	  As	  a	  result,	  while	  for	  
foreign	  tax	  purposes	  deductible	  royalties	  from	  the	  lower	  CFCs	  to	  the	  top	  CFC	  
would	  be	  effective	  in	  shifting	  profits	  to	  the	  low-­‐tax	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  top	  CFC	  
(and	  not	  subject	  to	  withholding	  under	  treaties),	  for	  US	  tax	  purposes	  these	  
royalties	  did	  not	  exist	  and	  so	  did	  not	  trigger	  a	  deemed	  dividend	  to	  the	  US	  
parent.	  In	  addition,	  deductible	  cost	  sharing	  payments	  could	  be	  made	  from	  
the	  US	  parent	  to	  the	  top	  CFC.	  
	  
This	  structure	  does	  not	  work	  any	  more,	  for	  three	  reasons.	  First,	  under	  BEPS	  
Action	  2,	  as	  implemented	  by	  the	  EU	  ATAP,	  the	  royalties	  from	  the	  bottom	  
CFCs	  to	  the	  top	  CFC	  would	  not	  be	  deductible	  because	  they	  are	  to	  a	  hybrid	  
entity.19	  Second,	  the	  cost	  sharing	  payments	  from	  the	  US	  parent	  to	  the	  top	  CFC	  
would	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  BEAT	  minimum	  tax.	  And	  finally,	  the	  top	  CFC	  as	  well	  
as	  all	  the	  disregarded	  entities	  below	  it	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  GILTI	  
minimum	  tax	  (10.5%	  or	  13.25%	  with	  foreign	  tax	  credits)	  on	  a	  current	  
basis.20	  The	  result	  is	  that	  US-­‐based	  MNEs	  need	  to	  restructure	  their	  foreign	  
operations	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  significantly	  higher	  worldwide	  
effective	  tax	  rate	  than	  before	  2018,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  check	  the	  box	  
and	  IRC	  section	  954(c)(6)	  have	  not	  been	  affected	  by	  the	  TCJA.	  	  
	  
4. The	  Future:	  A	  Revival	  of	  the	  Welfare	  State	  or	  the	  End	  of	  Globalization?	  
	  
“Globalization”	  predicted	  that	  unless	  something	  was	  done	  about	  limiting	  tax	  
competition,	  there	  would	  be	  a	  retreat	  from	  globalization	  and	  a	  revival	  of	  
nationalism.	  This	  has	  now	  happened,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  restrictions	  on	  
immigration	  and	  renewed	  tariffs	  and	  exchange	  controls.	  Increased	  
nationalism	  could	  even	  lead	  to	  a	  new	  world	  war.	  
	  
The	  last	  decade	  has	  seen	  significant	  limits	  to	  tax	  competition.	  But	  in	  order	  to	  
prevent	  further	  political	  damage,	  more	  needs	  to	  be	  done.	  First,	  additional	  
changes	  to	  bolster	  the	  ITR	  are	  required.	  Second,	  the	  added	  revenues	  should	  
be	  used	  to	  bolster	  the	  social	  safety	  net	  and	  prevent	  another	  Great	  Recession.	  
	  
There	  are	  three	  additional	  measures	  that	  I	  believe	  would	  strengthen	  the	  ITR.	  
	  
1. In	  regard	  to	  passive	  income,	  despite	  CRS	  and	  MAATM,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  the	  
solution	  can	  depend	  entirely	  on	  exchange	  of	  information	  and	  residence	  
based	  taxation.	  There	  are	  too	  many	  residence	  countries	  to	  cooperate	  
effectively,	  and	  there	  will	  always	  be	  some	  non-­‐cooperative	  tax	  havens	  to	  
attract	  evaders.	  But	  the	  key	  point	  is	  that	  portfolio	  investments	  are	  limited	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Under	  IRC	  954(c)(6),	  the	  payments	  would	  not	  trigger	  a	  deemed	  dividend	  even	  if	  
they	  were	  not	  disregarded.	  	  
19	  The	  same	  rule	  applies	  in	  the	  US	  after	  TCJA;	  see	  IRC	  267A.	  
20	  This	  assumes,	  as	  would	  be	  true	  in	  most	  cases,	  that	  the	  top	  CFC	  has	  no	  tangible	  
assets	  that	  would	  entitle	  the	  parent	  to	  exempt	  dividends	  under	  IRC	  245A.	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to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  large	  jurisdictions.	  If	  the	  US,	  EU	  and	  Japan	  could	  
cooperate	  to	  re-­‐institute	  withholding	  taxes	  on	  interest,	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  
problem	  could	  be	  resolved.21	  
2. In	  regard	  to	  active	  income,	  there	  are	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  residence	  
countries	  of	  MNEs	  (over	  90	  of	  the	  Fortune	  100	  are	  resident	  in	  the	  G20).	  If	  
all	  the	  G20	  could	  agree	  to	  further	  strengthen	  CFC	  rules	  to	  eliminate	  
exemption	  or	  deferral,	  most	  MNE	  income	  would	  be	  taxed	  currently.22	  In	  
the	  US	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  GILTI	  provision	  should	  be	  revised	  to	  
eliminate	  the	  10%	  deemed	  return	  exemption	  and	  increase	  the	  rate	  to	  
21%.23	  Strict	  anti-­‐inversion	  rules	  (e.g.,	  a	  managed	  and	  controlled	  
residency	  test)	  would	  eliminate	  the	  ability	  of	  MNEs	  to	  artificially	  move	  
out	  of	  the	  US.	  
3. Since	  active	  income	  should	  be	  taxed	  at	  source,	  and	  since	  tax	  competition	  
does	  not	  affect	  the	  market	  jurisdiction,	  the	  EU	  proposals	  for	  eliminating	  
the	  PE	  standard	  and	  substituting	  a	  virtual	  PE	  threshold	  for	  “significant	  
digital	  presence”	  should	  be	  adopted.24	  In	  addition,	  a	  formula	  should	  be	  
used	  to	  allocate	  residual	  profits	  under	  the	  arm’s	  length	  standard	  between	  
source	  jurisdictions.25	  These	  ideas	  were	  both	  broached	  by	  the	  OECD	  and	  
are	  likely	  to	  be	  adopted	  soon.	  The	  key	  issue	  is	  that	  the	  US	  and	  other	  G20	  
countries	  should	  grant	  foreign	  tax	  credits	  to	  such	  taxes.	  The	  fact	  that	  most	  
G20	  countries	  have	  similar	  tax	  rates	  should	  make	  such	  FTCs	  acceptable.	  
	  
What	  should	  be	  done	  with	  the	  added	  revenues?	  I	  believe	  the	  first	  and	  
necessary	  step	  would	  be	  to	  enhance	  the	  social	  safety	  net	  that	  was	  deeply	  
hurt	  by	  the	  Great	  Recession.	  In	  the	  US,	  this	  requires	  universal	  health	  
insurance,	  additional	  investment	  in	  education,	  and	  a	  massive	  
infrastructure	  program.	  	  
	  
In	  addition,	  I	  believe	  that	  steps	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  to	  enhance	  investment	  in	  
those	  regions	  of	  the	  US	  that	  were	  left	  behind	  in	  the	  recovery	  from	  the	  
Great	  Recession-­‐	  specifically,	  the	  area	  between	  the	  Mississippi	  and	  the	  
Appalachians.	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  corporate	  job	  creation	  in	  this	  area	  be	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encouraged	  by	  a	  zero	  tax	  rate	  for	  profits	  allocated	  to	  it	  by	  a	  formula	  that	  
hinges	  on	  job	  creation.26	  While	  the	  individual	  income	  tax	  must	  be	  
enforced	  to	  maintain	  progressivity,	  I	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  sacrifice	  most	  of	  
the	  corporate	  tax	  if	  corporations	  could	  be	  induced	  to	  create	  jobs	  in	  the	  
hinterland.	  
	  
The	  world	  faces	  a	  crucial	  choice	  in	  the	  2020s.	  We	  can	  either	  continue	  
retreating	  from	  globalization	  in	  favor	  of	  xenophobic	  nationalism,	  tariffs,	  
immigration	  restrictions,	  and	  exchange	  controls.	  That	  road	  leads	  
ultimately	  to	  war,	  as	  it	  did	  in	  the	  1930s.	  Or	  we	  can	  revive	  globalization	  by	  
investing	  in	  a	  robust	  social	  safety	  net,	  infrastructure,	  education,	  and	  job	  
creation.	  While	  more	  needs	  to	  be	  done,	  we	  have	  made	  significant	  
progress	  in	  curbing	  tax	  competition	  in	  the	  last	  decade.	  The	  key	  move	  now	  
is	  to	  take	  the	  added	  revenue	  and	  spend	  it	  wisely.	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